This paper studies the incidence and impact of bilateral redeployment of resources between target and acquiring firms following 253 horizontal acquisitions involving
I 1 Introduction
| This paper studies bilateral resource redeployment between target and acquiring firms following horizontal acquisitions. Resources are stocks of 6 knowledge, financial assets, physical assets, human capital, and other tangible •g and intangible factors that a business owns or controls (Grant, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) . Resource redeployment is the use by a target or acquiring business of the other firm's resources; redeployment may involve I transferring resources to new locations or sharing resources without physical <5 transfer. By bilateral redeployment, we mean cases in which firms redeploŷ resources both from an acquirer to a target and from the target to the J acquirer. Horizontal acquisitions involve businesses that operate in the same industry. We examine redeployment of ten types of resources, including several aspects of technical, commercial, administrative and financial resources. Drawing from a survey of firms in Europe and North America that undertook acquisitions during the 1980s and 1990s, we show that firms often undertake substantial bilateral resource redeployment following acquisitions and that bilateral redeployment tends to lead to substantial improvement in the capabilities of the newly combined firm.
Background
The purpose of the study is to help increase our understanding of how acquisitions help firms reshape their assets and capabilities in changing competitive environments. The research contrasts with common views of acquisitions in the organizational theory literature and traditional views of acquisitions in the economics literature. The established organizational literature tends to view acquisitions as the exercise of social power by the acquiring firm (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) or as imitative responses to environmentally determined institutional trends (e.g. Tolbert and Zucker, 1983{ ?})-A major theme in the traditional economics literature, meanwhile, has been that horizontal acquisitions help firms increase their market power (Heflebower, 1963; Stigler, 1964; Scherer, 1970) . Although much recent research has tempered the market power argument, market power still arises as a major theme in the popular press, in academic research and among the public concerning acquisitions (Scherer and Ross, 1990 ; US Department of Justice, 1992) . We readily accept that acquisitions sometimes involve substantial degrees of social power, imitation and market power, but we seek to advance the argument that acquisitions also play a fundamental role in the process of business reconfiguration.
Our position is similar to economic productive efficiency arguments, which argue that acquisitions provide a means for firms to obtain greater economies of scale as well as increased market power (e.g. Williamson, 1975; Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983; Jensen, 1986) . The efficiency view of acquisitions stresses two main types of economies. Rationalization economies stem from the disposition of unnecessary assets, while restructuring economies, or matching economies, arise from the recombination and specialization of assets into more efficient reconfigurations (Shepherd, 1979; Dutz, 1989 ; US Department of Justice, 1992, p. 30) . We argue that the primary rationalization and restructuring gains of acquisitions often arise from reshaping capabilities, rather than from more static increases in scale economies. Several studies have shown that opportunities for rationalization and restructuring in 454 horizontal acquisitions arise in the process of combining businesses following acquisitions (Tremblay and Tremblay, 1988; Anand and Singh, 1997) . In this sense, many acquisitions are part of firms' strategic reconfiguration process. Strategy research has long argued that acquisitions help firms to reconfigure business organizations (e.g. Berry, 1975; Steiner, 1975; Rock and Rock, 1990; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1990; Bowman and Singh, 1993) . In previous work, we have argued that one cannot discriminate neatly between the productive efficiency and strategic reconfiguration views (Mitchell, 1994; Capron, 1997; Capron and Mitchell, 1997) . Instead, the two views tend to converge, in the sense that firms may need to undertake substantial business reconfiguration of design and engineering activities, production systems, supplier networks, marketing systems, administrative support, and other commercialization activities in order to produce and sell greater volumes of goods. Strategy research suggests that business reconfiguration tends to be a central part of gaining productive efficiency following horizontal acquisitions (e.g. Lubatkin and O'Neill, 1988; Seth, 1990a,b; Anand and Singh, 1997) .
A limit to strategy research concerning acquisitions and business reconfiguration is that the work has emphasized unilateral exchange. One strand of the work tends to view acquisitions as part of a growth process in which, owing to market failure in the exchange of discrete resources, firms with excess resources buy weaker firms and then use the acquirer's excess resources to improve the targets' capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Hennart and Park, 1993) . The second main strand of the reconfiguration research emphasizes the view that acquiring firms may obtain resources from the target business (e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Eun etal., 1996; Penner-Hahn, 1998) . Empirical research provides substantial support for both strands of the unilateral reconfiguration literature. That is, many acquisitions involve resource redeployment to or from a target firm. At the same time, though, the managerial literature and business press frequently discuss cases in which firms reconfigure both the target and the acquiring firms following horizontal acquisitions. The research literature has paid little attention to such bilateral cases. Although strategy theorists have long argued that bilateral reconfiguration often provides substantial benefits to acquiring and target businesses (e.g. Salter and Weinhold, 1979) , little systematic research has investigated such bilateral exchange. We seek to begin to explore this issue in more depth, by studying the degree to which firms redeploy resources both to and from target businesses.
The underlying motivational issue for why firms would want to undertake bilateral redeployment is straightforward. Firms often have more to gain by 455 attempting to improve the capabilities of both the acquiring and target firm than by emphasizing reconfiguration of only one party to the acquisition. Having taken ownership of a target business, the acquiring firm will benefit financially if both businesses become stronger. Firms invariably have heterogeneous sets of capabilities (Teece, 1980 (Teece, , 1987 Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986) . In many acquisition cases, both the acquirer and the target possess technical, commercial, managerial or financial capabilities that would benefit the other business. Moreover, firms can often redeploy resources in such a way that the business that provides the resources does not lose access to them. That is, many resources have a public good nature, such that they do not become fully exhausted with use. For instance, one firm can often provide technical skills, manufacturing systems, brand names, sales and distribution networks, and managerial systems without impairing its own use of those resources. Thus, resource redeployment often provides increasing returns to scale, as long as the additional benefit of using the resource in a new location exceeds the cost of redeploying the resource to the new location. Given this straightforward financial motivation, one should expect many acquiring firms to undertake extensive bilateral resource redeployment following acquisitions.
If one accepts the preceding argument, perhaps the most obvious question is why bilateral resource redeployment is not the dominant outcome of horizontal acquisitions and the dominant emphasis of acquisition research, rather than an underemphasized phenomenon. Clearly, there must be substantial limits to firms' ability to undertake bilateral redeployment. Some such limits might be bureaucratic in nature, in the sense that managers of the acquiring firms may emphasize only one set of opportunities, whether to apply excess resources to the target or to obtain resources from the target, at the expense of foregone bilateral opportunities. Similarly, researchers sometimes emphasize the direction of resource redeployment that is pertinent to a particular conceptual view, paring away redeployment issues that appear secondary. We hope that this research can help remove bureaucratic blinders and extend conceptual boundaries. Many limits to bilateral redeployment, though, will be more fundamental than bureaucratic blinders and unilateral concepts.
We briefly outline three fundamental limits to bilateral redeployment, including lack of resources, resource exhaustion and lack of divisibility. First, a target or acquiring firm may simply lack resources that have value for the other business. Second, although some resources have public good elements, other resources become exhausted when they are used. Financial resources, for instance, typically can be spent only once, at least until a firm begins to realize a return from its cash investment. Similarly, managerial effort is a scarce 456 resource that can be expended in only one location at a time. Many physical assets, also, cannot be transferred without loss. Thus, although one business might be able to teach another how to undertake a particular development or manufacturing process without impairing its own ability to operate, the business cannot transfer laboratory or manufacturing physical assets to the other without losing development and production capabilities. Third, in addition to resource exhaustion, indivisibility also creates problems. Some resources are sufficiently indivisible that even if a business has excess exhaustible resources or superior skills in non-exhaustive resources, the business cannot separate the resources that it does not need from the resources that the business must retain for its own use. Given bureaucratic problems and more fundamental limits, firms will often undertake only unilateral resource redeployment following acquisitions. A key issue, then, is which types of resources are best suited to bilateral redeployment.
This study examines bilateral and unilateral redeployment of ten types of resources following 253 acquisitions that occurred in Europe and North America between 1988 and 1992. The ten resources include two types of technical resources (product innovation, manufacturing), three types of commercial resources (sales networks, brand names, marketing expertise), four types of administrative resources (supplier relationships, logistic expertise, managerial capabilities, staff personnel), and financial resources. Most of these categories emphasize resources that often have substantial tacitness, which face market failure in discrete exchange between independent companies and so tend to be the focus of resource redeployment within the single corporation that results from an acquisition (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; . In total, we examine 100 pairwise combinations of bilateral redeployment. We examine the degree to which firms undertake bilateral redeployment in the ten cases with the same type of resource, such as redeploying product innovation resources both to and from the target business. In addition, we examine the degree to which firms undertake cross-resource bilateral redeployment in the remaining 90 cross-resource combinations, such as cases in which acquirers redeploy product innovation resources to the target while also redeploying brand names to the acquirer.
We also examine the impact of bilateral redeployment of technical, commercial, administrative and financial resources on several dimensions of the acquiring and target businesses' combined capabilities. The capability dimensions include R&D capabilities, time to market, product quality, product cost and output flexibility. We compare the outcomes of high and moderate bilateral redeployment, unilateral redeployment to acquirers, unilateral redeployment to targets and low redeployment. The results help 457 understand how different forms of redeployment affect businesses' current and future capabilities. We view the study as exploratory. Therefore, we do not present hypotheses concerning the relative degree of bilateral redeployment or the impact of redeployment in the 100 cases. We expect that the empirical relationships will help us understand the degree to which different types of resources offer potential for bilateral exchange and improved business capabilities.
Despite the exploratory nature of the research, the preceding argument concerning redeployment limits suggests that redeployment of financial resources and other resources will differ. Bilateral redeployment involving financial resources will probably be less common than other forms of redeployment. Financial resources tend to be consumed in use. By contrast, many of the resources underlying product innovation, manufacturing, sales networks, brand names, marketing expertise, supplier relationships and logistic systems are both divisible and conserved during use. For instance, a firm can sometimes use its existing sales networks to sell additional goods, use existing brands for goods that it sells in new geographic markets or market segments, or use existing suppliers to help improve new products without impairing the firm's existing activities. In addition, financial resources are often explicit rather than tacit, so that firms do not need to undertake business acquisitions in order to exchange or obtain financial resources.
In summary, we believe that bilateral resource redeployment following horizontal acquisitions is an important and underemphasized part of the process of business reconfiguration. Firms have strong financial incentives to improve the capabilities of both the target and the acquiring businesses. At the same time, firms face substantial limits to bilateral redeployment. We will study redeployment often types of resources in 253 acquisitions that occurred between 1988 and 1992. In turn, we examine the impact of bilateral resource redeployment on R&D capabilities, time to market, product quality, product cost and output flexibility of the newly combined firm. Some of the resources face serious resource exhaustion limits, but others are divisible and conserved during use. We hope that the study will demonstrate the degree to which bilateral redeployment is a common feature of acquisitions and help understand which types of resources best suit bilateral redeployment as part of the process of business reconfiguration.
Data
We gathered the data for this study through a survey in 1994 of American and European companies. We chose the survey approach because publicly available financial information does not provide the level of detail that we need for our research interests. The sample consisted of 1778 horizontal acquisitions that took place during the 1988-1992 period between manufacturing companies operating within the same industry, defined at the level of about the four-digit US Standard Industrial Classification. We chose horizontal acquisitions in order to focus the sample on a set of cases for which traditional alternative arguments concerning market power and static efficiencies are highly relevant. We chose the 1988-1992 period in order to exclude recent acquisitions in which post-acquisition decisions had not yet led to resource redeployment at the time of the survey, as well as older acquisitions for which managerial turnover makes it difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition activities. Sources for the information include the International Merger Yearbook (1990 Yearbook ( , 1991 Yearbook ( , 1992 , Merger and Acquisitions Sourcebook (1990 , Mergers and Acquisitions International (1990 and Fusions et Acquisitions Magazine (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992) . The sample of 1778 cases includes all acquisitions that the data sources reported for which we were able to obtain addresses; our initial list included 2020 cases. The research literature commonly uses this methodology to gather data concerning firm attributes and post-acquisition consolidation processes (e.g. Cool et al., 1989; Hunt, 1990; Datta, 1991) .
The survey process proceeded in four phases. In the first phase, we developed measurement scales based on the relevant literature and discussed the scales with academics and consultants. We then constructed a preliminary version of the questionnaire, written in both English and French. In the second phase, we pretested the English and French versions of the questionnaire during site interviews and with senior executives who were attending executive education programmes at two major business schools located in the United States and in France. The executives had a wide range of backgrounds, including finance, marketing and production. The pretests aimed at ensuring that the respondents understood the questions in the context that we intended. To ensure that the executives had equivalent understanding of the English and French versions of the questions, the same bilingual scholar conducted the pretest process. This pretest led us to clarify some questions and to add some items that the executives suggested. Our third stage consisted of a pilot survey with the revised survey instrument during on-site interviews with CEOs or executives in charge of acquisition programmes in ten large firms, which resulted in the final version of the questionnaire. We base the content validity of the resource redeployment measures on this careful process of developing the items and pretesting the 459 questions. In the fourth stage of the data collection process, we mailed the survey to the acquiring companies based in North America and the European Community. We designed and administered the mail survey under guidelines established in Dillman's (1978) total design method. We addressed the surveys to the chief executives of the business units that undertook the acquisitions. In the cover letter, we requested that either the CEO or a senior executive with overall responsibility for the acquisition case studied complete the survey. We also sent two follow-up letters and one replacement questionnaire within the next three weeks following the first mail.
We received 273 responses to our mailing of 1778 cases, for a response rate of 15%. This is an acceptable response rate given the setting of the survey and the positions of the respondents. The positions of the respondents included CEO, president, executive chair, vice-president of finance and managing director. The response rate is comparable to other studies that use similar methodology, which typically report response rates that range from 14 to 27% (e.g. Datta, 1991; Powell, 1992; Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997) , and is similar or higher than recent large-scale surveys involving senior executives (e.g. Robertson etal, 1995; Gatignon etal., 1997; Powell and Dent-Micalleff, 1997) . Note, too, that most past studies involved single domestic markets, while our survey involves firms based in more than a dozen countries on two continents. Given the study's requirement for senior management involvement, sensitive information, firm diversity, industry range and country variety, our response rate is acceptable.
Based on the descriptive information in the responses, we eliminated 20 cases that did not appear to fit within our scope of horizontal acquisitions, leaving a final data set of 253 cases. The data set includes 253 unique targets and 190 unique acquirers, with the smaller number of acquirers occurring because some firms acquired more than one target and returned a separate response for each acquisition case. The data set has a broad distribution of acquiring and target firms. This is the largest and most diverse set of detailed information concerning resource redeployment between target and acquiring firms following acquisitions that we know of.
The Appendix contains descriptive information concerning the data. The appendix shows that 82% of the acquiring firms and 64% of the targets were located in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. Where possible, we also obtained information concerning acquisition prices. Many firms do not report acquisition purchase prices, especially firms based outside Britain and the United States, but we obtained information concerning purchase prices for 24% of the 2020 cases in the initial sample and 13% of the 253 respondents in the data set. The purchase prices ranged 460 in value from <$1 m. to >$1 b., with median value of $21 m. among the initial sample and $42 m. among the respondents. Thus, the respondents appear to be somewhat larger than the initial sample. The sample also emphasizes older targets, as 71% of the targets were >15 years old. Therefore, we must condition our interpretation in the context of somewhat larger acquisitions and older businesses, which will tend to provide somewhat greater opportunities for resource redeployment.
We undertook several analyses of potential non-response biases. We compared the industries in our responses with the industries in the initial sample, finding no material differences. We compared early respondents (first half) with late respondents (second half), following Amstrong and Overton (1977) , finding no material difference on key characteristics such as market conditions, acquisition motives and industry characteristics. We recognize that resource redeployment still might differ systematically among respondents and non-respondents. The primary concerns would be if non-respondents systematically tended to redeploy few resources or redeploy resources unilaterally rather than bilaterally. There is no obvious reason why managers of firms that did not redeploy resources would systematically avoid responding to the survey. On the other hand, acquisition size may condition the results somewhat, as we note above. We believe that the data reflect tendencies in acquisition outcomes, especially among larger acquisitions.
In addition to non-response bias, respondent bias also arises as an issue in survey research. We chose a single-respondent approach because the alternative multiple-respondent approach raises practical problems. Respondents must be knowledgeable about the firm and its competitive environment (Campbell, 1955) , as well as, in our research, the consolidation processes following the acquisition. In a large sample study, finding multiple wellinformed respondents is difficult or impossible. Moreover, determining whether divergence between multiple respondents stems from unequal levels of knowledge or real disparity in assessments raises substantial empirical problems. The key methodological solution in a single-respondent approach, therefore, is to find the most appropriate respondent (John and Reve, 1982) . We qualified our respondents as individuals who held a CEO or equivalent position, or had been involved as senior managers of the acquisition process. We pretested our survey to ensure that this targeted group of executives understood our questions.
We recognize that the survey records the acquirers' view of the exchanges. We believe that managers of the acquiring firms can assess resource redeployment within the time frame of the study. Senior managers from the acquirers will tend to be most knowledgeable about the post-acquisition 461 activities, owing to the high level of target CEO turnover following acquisitions (Walsh, 1988) . Although we recognize that target managers may have different opinions about acquisition outcomes than acquirer managers, it is difficult or impossible to track former executives of the targets. Therefore, we rely on acquirer managers' opinions and must condition the results in this light.
Method
We chose a descriptive approach for the analysis, in which we examined the summary values of the individual questions in order to determine relationships among the redeployment variables. This approach allows us to study the multidimensional main outcomes directly and suits the exploratory nature of the study. Table l (a,b) reports the resource types, the survey questions that we used to form the resource redeployment variables, and summary statistics. In the focal questions, we asked firms to report the extent to which they had used resources from the acquired and target business to assist their existing business and the target, respectively. The answers to the survey questions measure the magnitude of resource redeployment following the acquisitions, with scores that range from 1 ('Not at all') to 5 (To a very large extent'). We used the answers to the questions in Table l (a) to define variables measuring bilateral redeployment. We used two operationalizations of bilateral redeployment. First, we classified cases in which both the target and the acquirer received a score of at least 3 ('To some extent') for a given pair of resources as cases of bilateral redeployment, examining both same-resource pairs and pairwise combinations of different resources. Second, we defined a higher degree of bilateral redeployment as cases in which both the target and acquirer received a score of at least 4 (midway between 'To some extent' and 'To a very large extent') for a given pair of resources. The two operationalizations, i.e. of moderate and high bilateral redeployment, provide sensitivity analysis given the issue of boundary ambiguity in classifying bilateral redeployment.
For comparison with bilateral redeployment, we also defined three other redeployment variables, for (i) unilateral redeployment to acquirer, (ii) unilateral redeployment to target and (iii) low redeployment. We defined unilateral redeployment to acquirer as resource pairs in which the acquirer received a score of at least 3 but the target received <3. In symmetry, we defined unilateral redeployment to target as cases in which the target received a score of at least 3 but the acquirer received <3. We defined low 462 The correlations in the lower left rectangle report bilateral correlations among the resource types, which show firms' tendencies to redeploy resources both from an acquirer to a target and from the target to the acquirer. redeployment as cases in which both the target and the acquirer received scores <3.
Results
We first outline redeployment frequency. We then briefly discuss the impact of bilateral and unilateral resource redeployment on the aggregate capabilities of the newly combined acquirer and target business.
Redeployment Frequency Table 2 (a,b) reports the redeployment outcomes. We will first describe the meaning of the numbers in Table 2 (a). Each cell in the table reports the number of cases with little redeployment (Little), unilateral redeployment to acquirers (UA), unilateral redeployment to targets (UT) and bilateral redeployment (Bilat). The first bilateral figure in each cell of the table represents cases of at least moderate bilateral redeployment, which is the number of cases with bilateral redeployment scores of at least 3-The bilateral figures in parentheses in each cell include only the cases with high bilateral redeployment, which is the number of cases with bilateral scores of at least 4. We will refer to each cell in the table in terms of its rowxolumn position, i.e. as cell (x:y), with x being the row and y the column. As an example, examine the cell (1:1) in the upper left of the table, which reports redeployment of product innovation resources to acquirers and to targets in 213 cases. There were 37 cases (17%) with little redeployment, i.e. where the response was <,2 for both the acquirer and the target. There were 30 cases (14%) of unilateral redeployment to acquirers, which are cases in which the score for the acquirer was ^3, while the score for the target was <3. There were 50 cases (23%) of unilateral redeployment to targets, which are cases in which the score for the target was £3, while the score for the acquirer was <3. There were 96 cases (45%) of bilateral redeployment of product innovation resources, which are cases in which the response was £3 for both the acquirer and the target. Finally, there were 27 cases (13%) of high bilateral redeployment, which are cases in which the response was ^4 for both the acquirer and the target. In cell (1:1), then, ~45% of the cases (96/213) involved at least a moderate degree of bilateral redeployment. Table 2 (a) stand out. We briefly note the frequency of unilateral redeployment and then discuss the incidence of bilateral redeployment in more detail. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g. , the results show that resource redeployment is common following acquisitions. Notice that unilateral redeployment occurs most often as redeployment to targets (UT) rather than to acquiring firms (UA), which is shown by the fact that second figure in the middle row of each cell tends to be larger than the first figure. Thus, many of the cases of unilateral redeployment appear to follow the Penrose-inspired argument that acquirers often seek opportunities to employ excess resources, while a smaller number of cases appear to follow a logic of using resources from a target for the benefit of the acquiring firm. Beyond the unilateral results, the results in Table 2 also demonstrate that bilateral redeployment following horizontal acquisitions was common.
Several results in
We next discuss several aspects of the results concerning same-resource, similar-resource, vertically related and other cases of bilateral redeployment. By same resources, we mean resources that fall within the same category. By similar resources, we mean resources that are used at similar points of the value-added processes within the business system, which we define as technical, commercial, administrative and financial sets of resources. By vertically related resources, we mean resources that commonly link vertically with each other in the commercialization process. We use these approximate classifications in order to provide a framework for the discussion, while recognizing that there is substantial ambiguity concerning resource relationships and comparisons. Our goal is to focus on interrelationships among tesource categories, rather than to create an exhaustive superstructure of resource classification.
Same-resource Bilateral Redeployment
Initially, consider the results for same-resource bilateral redeployment, which lie along the diagonal of Table 2 (a) and Table 2 (b). We report these cases in bold italic typeface. Firms undertook to 'some extent' or greater of sameresource bilateral redeployment in about a third or more of the first six types of cases, including product innovation, manufacturing, sales networks, brand names, marketing expertise and supplier relationships. The respective specific figutes are 96 (45%; cell 1:1), 96 (40%; cell 2:2), 94 (40%, cell 3:3), 75 (32%, cell 4:4), 91 (40%, cell 5:5) and 82 (34%, cell 6:6) of the cases. Even using the high level of redeployment measure in Table 2 (a), the tesults show extensive bilateral redeployment in the first six same-resource cases, with 27 (13%; cell 1:1), 33 (14%; cell 2:2), 42 (18%; cell 3:3), 40 (17%; cell 4:4), 28 (12%; cell 5:5) and 34 (14%; cell 6:6) of the cases. Bilateral same-resource redeployment is less common among the last four categories, including logistic expertise, staff personnel, managerial capabilities and financial resources. Even here, though, the logistic and personnel figures reach about a quarter of the cases, with 50 (21%; cell 7:7) and 63 cases (28%; cell 8:8) showing at least moderate bilateral redeployment. The clear implication of the same-resource results is that firms often use both target and acquirer resources to help reconfigure the capabilities of each business. Same-resource bilateral redeployment is unusual only in the more exhaustible and explicit category of financial resources and the managerial capabilities category.
The contrast between the same-resource results for managerial capabilities and staff personnel are particularly interesting. Notice that firms undertake bilateral redeployment of staff personnel more often than of managerial capabilities. Firms undertake redeployment of staff personnel through the transfer and rotation of individual staff members. It is likely that bilateral transfer and rotation of individual employees often helps with post-acquisition integration of the acquirer and target businesses. By contrast, 468 managerial capabilities represent systems rather than individual skills, such as reporting systems, planning tools and financial expertise. In many cases, firms prefer to use one set of managerial capabilities across the two firms, rather than attempt to integrate disparate management systems. For behavioural reasons stemming from familiarity, if for no other reason, acquirers are likely to use their existing managerial capabilities for both businesses rather than adopt the target's managerial practices. The unilateral redeployment figures for managerial capabilities bear out this interpretation. Acquirers unilaterally redeploy managerial capabilities to targets in almost three-quarters (167; cell 9:9) of the cases, but almost never unilaterally redeploy managerial capabilities from the target (4 cases; cell 9:9). Acquirers clearly prefer to rely on their own managerial capabilities than draw on the target's capabilities. It is also useful to compare bilateral same-resource redeployment to the unilateral redeployment figures that lie along the diagonal of the table. Using the moderate measure of bilateral redeployment, we find that bilateral redeployment has similar magnitude to unilateral redeployment for the first six types of resources. Again, this is strong evidence that firms often use resources from both the acquirer and the target to reconfigure the postacquisition businesses, rather than simply obtain resources from one business for the benefit of the other.
With the exception of financial and managerial resources, these results suggest that in many cases merging firms take advantage of each other's relative strengths within the same resource area. This result is similar to the empirical results of international trade analysis, which finds substantial intra-industry trade across borders (Greenaway and Torstensson, 1997) . Although unilateral redeployment sometimes provides one means of reshaping capabilities, these data show that firms often use bilateral redeployment to tap into the other business's stocks of resources through mutual exchange. Even within the same resource area, resource endowments of the merging firms often complement each other. In these results, bilateral resource redeployment most often involves resource areas that often face market failures (Barney, 1991; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991) . By contrast, managerial and financial resources, which involve lower degrees of bilateral redeployment in these results, face a lesser degree of market failure. Mutual exchange might not help build financial and managerial resources, so that redeployment of such resources is more likely to occur unilaterally. The data clearly show that redeployment of managerial and financial resources often occurs unilaterally from the acquirer to the target, involving 167 (70%, cell 9:9) and 184 (78%, cell 10:10) of the cases. Thus, the acquirer often appears to provide the target with administrative and financial support, rather 469 than combine administrative and financial resources of the target and acquirer. For sensitivity analysis concerning the dependence of bilateral redeployment on the relative size of the acquiring and target businesses, we also calculated chi-square tests of independence in which we compared high bilateral resource redeployment in cases for which targets were at least 75% of the size of the acquirer (14% of the cases) to the remaining cases. With two exceptions, we found no evidence of significant dependence between relative size and bilateral resource redeployment. The exceptions were for management and financial redeployment where, quite reasonably, high bilateral redeployment of managerial and financial capabilities tended to involve relatively large targets.
Similar-resource Bilateral Redeployment
In addition to the same-resources cases that lie along the diagonal of the table, several aspects of similar-resource bilateral redeployment lie close to the diagonal of the table. We use three aggregate classes of similar resources, including technical, commercial and administrative resources. First, innovation and manufacturing resources are one example of similar resources, which we will refer to descriptively as a more general class of technical resources. Second, sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise are another instance of similar resources, which we will refer to as a general class of commercial resources. Third, capabilities such as supplier relationships, logistic expertise, staff personnel and managerial capabilities comprise a general class of similar resources that we will refer to as administrative resources.
Four results concerning similar resources are striking. First, firms often undertake bilateral redeployment of product innovation and manufacturing technical resources, which lie in cells (1:2) and (2:1) of the table. The likely interpretation of this result is that acquirers often seek targets with complementary innovation and manufacturing skills, which offer opportunities to improve the technical skills of both businesses after the acquisition. Note that within the product innovation and manufacturing categories, bilateral resource redeployment approaches or exceeds unilateral resource redeployment (the total of the UA and UT figures). These results suppon the idea that acquisitions represent a means for both firms to benefit from the other's technical resource stock. Neither the acquirer's desire to redeploy its excessive resources nor its desire to tap a target's resources uniquely drive many acquisitions. In many cases, resource leverage derives from mutual exchange.
The second notable result concerning similar resources is that firms often undertake bilateral redeployment within the commercial resource class of sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise. These figures lie in cells (3:4), (3:5), (4:3), (4:5), (5:3) and (5:4). All the commercial resources relate to sales and marketing activities. Within the nine cells pertaining to the commercial resource class, the near-diagonal values in the six similar-resource cells, i.e. cells (3:4), (3:5), (4:3), (4:5), (5:3) and (5:4), approach or exceed the on-diagonal values of the three same resource cells, i.e. cells (3:3), (4:4) and (5:5). Overall, firms often appear to expect benefits from undertaking joint reconfiguration of both the target and the acquirer's commercial capabilities. These results suggest that firms commonly use acquisitions to extend brand portfolios, to broaden market capabilities through sharing sales networks, and to exchange location-specific assets such as sales networks. Marketing resources likely represent a good template for mutual exchange and revenue-based synergy through an increase in sales volume.
The third notable similar-resource result concerns administrative resources, where the tendencies that we noted above were substantially weaker. Although some bilateral resource redeployment relationships appeared, such as redeployment of supplier relationships to acquirer being associated with redeployment of managerial capabilities to targets (6:9), unilateral redeployment of administrative resources from acquirers to targets tended to dominate the patterns of resource redeployment. For example, managerial resource redeployment to acquirer associated with supplier relationship resource redeployment to target in only 30 cases (13%; cell 9:6), against 130 cases (55%) of unilateral supplier relationship redeployment to target. Similarly, managerial resource redeployment to acquirers associated with logistic resource redeployment to target in only 23 cases (9%, cell 9:7), against 123 cases (53%) of unilateral logistic resource redeployment to target. These near-diagonal values of similar-resource bilateral redeployment were as low as the on-diagonal values of same-managerial resources, in which bilateral redeployment represented only 39 cases (17%, cell 9:9) and unilateral redeployment to target 167 cases (70%). Overall, administrative resources do not constitute the primary focal area for mutual resource exchange. This outcome might stem from the general nature of such resources, which often are not unique to an organization and, instead, are more standard, substitutable and teachable. Compared to technical resources, which are often highly firm-specific, and commercial resources, which are often highly contextspecific , an acquirer may simply replace many of a target's administrative capabilities in order to align them with the acquirer's systems. That is, acquirers are more likely to impose their admin-471 istrative skills on the target than they are to build a new integrated administrative system. Finally, an interesting administrative resource contrast appears in the two cells that report bilateral redeployment of personnel and managerial capabilities. Notice the bilateral redeployment of managerial capabilities to the target and personnel to the acquirer is common (85 cases; cell 9:8), while the reverse is much less frequent (29 cases; cell 8:9). The most likely interpretation is that acquirers often rotate personnel from the target business through the acquirer's business in order to teach them the managerial systems that the acquirer wants the target business to learn. This result hihglights the importance of personal contact in learning managerial systems.
Vertically-related Resource Bilateral Redeployment
We now turn to the discussion of bilateral redeployment across several vertically related categories of resources classes. Bilateral redeployment of technical and commercial resources was very common. This effect was symmetric, i.e. technical resource redeployment to targets is commonly associated with commercial resource redeployment to acquirers, while technical resource redeployment to acquirers is commonly associated with commercial resource redeployment to targets. In this respect, notice the frequent use of bilateral redeployment among the technicalxommercial cells of the table, which include (1:3), (1:4), (1:5), (2:3), (2:4) and (2:5), along with the complementary figures in cells (3:1), (3:2), (4:1), (4:2), (5:1) and (5:2). The off-diagonal values of vertically related resource categories were commonly greater than the on-diagonal values of similar-resource categories. For example, product innovation resource redeployment to targets associated with redeployment to acquirers of sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise in respectively 104 (44%; 3:1), 91 (39%; 4:1) and 61 (29%; 5:1) of the cases. Similarly, manufacturing resource redeployment to targets associated with redeployment to acquirers of sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise in respectively 106 (45%; 3:2), 95 (41%; 4:2) and 91 (39%; 5:2) of the cases. Conversely, product innovation resource redeployment to acquirers associated with redeployment to target of sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise in respectively 89 (39%; 1:3), 75 (32%; 1:4) and 92 (39%; 1:5) of the cases. Similarly, manufacturing resource redeployment to acquirers associated with redeployment to target of sales networks, brand names and marketing expertise in respectively 79 (34%; 2:3), 68 (29%; 2:4) and 83 (35%; 2:5) of the cases. This symmetric effect of bilateral redeployment of technical and marketing resources suggests 472 that merging firms often exchange resources beyond focal common resource areas in order to build on their respective strengths across technical and commercial areas. One can also view the supplier relationship and logistic expertise categories, which lie in rows 6 and 7 and down columns 6 and 7, as being somewhat vertically related to the technical and commercial resources in rows and columns 1-5. Again, bilateral redeployment is common in the cells involving supplier relationships and logistic expertise, on the one hand, and technical and commercial resources, on the other. Only with some of the cases involving redeployment of logistic expertise to the acquirer does the bilateral redeployment incidence decline markedly, such as in cells (7:2), (7:3), (7:4) and (7:7). Each of these cells has at most 50 cases of bilateral redeployment (-20%). The likely explanation for the low incidence of bilateral redeployment involving logistic expertise to the acquirer is similar to the managerial capability explanation, i.e. acquirers often prefer to use their own logistics systems after an acquisition, rather than attempt to integrate disparate systems. Again, though, the general conclusion concerning vertically related resources is that firms often undertake bilateral redeployment, just as they did in the case of same-resources and similar-resources.
Other Cases of Bilateral Resource Redeployment
We next consider several other forms of bilateral redeployment, including cases concerning staff personnel, managerial capabilities and financial capabilities. It is useful to examine the relationship between bilateral redeployment of managerial capabilities and staff personnel with respect to other resources. The managerial capabilities results lie in the cells along row 9 and down column 9 of the table.
Bilateral redeployment of technical resource and managerial capabilities were common, but this effect was asymmetric depending upon the recipient of the technical resources. When the recipient of the technical redeployment was the target, the redeployment of managerial capabilities to acquirer was fairly low, involving 32 cases (14%; cell 9:1) and 36 cases (16%; cell 9:2) for product innovation resources and manufacturing resources redeployment to target respectively. By contrast, when the recipient of the technical redeployment was the acquirer, the redeployment of managerial capabilities to target was high, involving 106 cases (47%; 1:9) and 104 cases (43%; 2:9) for product innovation resources and manufacturing resources redeployment to acquirers. The asymmetric effect might suggest that acquiring firms are very likely to send managerial capabilities to the target when they receive 473 technical resources from the target. Several reasons might cause the asymmetric association, including the acquirers' incentive to improve the target's efficiency, to control the resource redeployment processes or to help the target grow. By contrast, the acquirer does not repatriate managerial capabilities from the target when the target is the recipient of the acquirer's technical resources, probably because most acquirers prefer to rely on their own managerial practices. Note that the same asymmetric effect occurs between technical resource and financial resource redeployment. When the acquirer obtains technical resources from the target, the acquirer often sends financial resources to the target, involving 110 (49%; cell 1:10) and 91 (40%; cell 2:10) cases for product innovation and manufacturing resources. By contrast, acquirers that send technical resources to a target rarely repatriate financial resources from the target, involving only 25 (12%; 10:1) and 23 (10%; 10:2) cases for product innovation and manufacturing resources. These results suggest that acquirers tend to support target development when an acquirer hopes to profit from the target's technical resources.
The bilateral redeployment of commercial resources and managerial or financial resources display the same pattern we described for technical resources. Acquiring firms often redeploy managerial and financial resources to targets when the acquirer receives the target's sales networks, brand names or marketing expertise (3:9), (3:10), (4:9), (4:10), (5:9), (5:10). By contrast, acquiring firms are less likely to obtain managerial and financial resources from targets to which the acquirers redeployed marketing expertise (9:3), (10:3), (9:4), (10:4), (9:5), (10:5). These results are consistent with the tendency of acquiring firms to provide targets with supportive managerial and financial resources when targets have technical and commercial resources that will assist the acquirer.
An intriguing extension of the earlier comparison of managerial capabilities and staff personnel arises when we examine the cells that lie well away from the diagonal of Table 2(a). Acquirers often redeploy managerial capabilities to targets from which acquirers obtain all resources other than financial resources (column 9), while firms much less often redeploy managerial capabilities from targets to acquirers that send resources to the targets (row 9). Notice, in contrast, that the results for staff personnel in row 8 and column 8 show the opposite pattern relative to the managerial capabilities. That is, firms frequently bring staff from the target to the acquirer when they send other resources to the target, even though acquirers rarely use the target's managerial capabilities. As in the earlier discussion of cases that lie near the diagonal of the table, the most likely explanation for this contrasting pattern is that acquirers want to teach the personnel of targets that have desirable 474
resources about the acquirer's business, presumably because the acquirers want the targets to tailor their ongoing use and development of the desirable resources to the acquirers' particular needs. Conversely, acquirers appear to have less interest in using personnel transfer to learn about the target's business. Rather than learn about the target business as a whole, acquirers tend to be more interested in specific resources of the target that they can redeploy to the acquiring firm. Finally, consider bilateral redeployment of financial resources with respect to other resources. The results concerning financial redeployment to targets, which appear in column 10, are particularly striking. We earlier discussed cases near the diagonal of the table and now note that cases well away from the diagonal have a similar pattern. Acquirers frequently send financial resources to targets from which they obtain most other types of resources. In some sense, then, acquirers appear to pay targets for the resources that they obtain. This is an intriguing result, because an acquirer has already paid the target's prior owners for the resources when the acquisition took place. Instead of a payment for past resource redeployment, then, the bilateral resource redeployment of operating resources from the target and financial resources to the target more likely represents an investment in future resource development by a business that has demonstrated the ability to develop resources that the acquiring business wants to use. This result contrasts with the argument that acquirers often obtain resources from targets and then sell off remaining portions of the targets (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) . Instead, these results suggest that many acquiring firms view target businesses as profitable opportunities for continued business development.
The summary assessment of the redeployment frequency analysis is that post-acquisition bilateral redeployment is common. We now turn to an exploratory analysis of how bilateral redeployment affects business capabilities. We will focus on the aggregate capabilities of the newly combined target and acquiring businesses.
Redeployment Impact
Resource redeployment is likely to affect the capabilities of the newly combined businesses. Although a full discussion of redeployment impact is beyond the scope of this paper, we will outline the impact of redeploying resources on five types of business capabilities, including R&D capabilities, time to market, product quality, product cost and output flexibility. We chose to examine these five capabilities as examples of skills that are critically important to firms' current business operations and to their future operations. We focus on the aggregate capabilities of the target and acquiring businesses in order to focus our initial analysis. We measured the impact of the acquisition on the firms' capabilities based on responses to questions that we asked in the survey. For each of the five types of capabilities, we asked the respondents to assess the impact of the acquisition on the capabilities of the target business, the acquiring business and the consolidated business. The questions provided a five-point scale, ranging from negative impact to positive impact. We then created five variables to measure capabilities improvement by taking the mean response of the answers to each question across the target, acquiring and combined businesses. The five measures assess the impact of the acquisition on the aggregate capabilities of the post-acquisition businesses.
We used the 'similar resource' categories in Table 2 to create five redeployment variables for the analysis of capabilities improvement. We tested for the statistical discriminant and convergent validity of the four categories of similar resources that we used in discussing Table 2 , including technical, commercial, administration and financial resources. We found that technical (product innovation, manufacturing) and commercial (sales networks, brand names, marketing expertise) resources stood as distinct statistical constructs. We also found that the administrative category separated statistically into two subcategories that stood as distinct statistical constructs, including operational administrative (supplier relationships, logistics expertise) and general administrative (managerial capabilities, staff personnel) capabilities. Finally, we used financial resources as the fifth redeployment variable.
We created five categorical measures that denoted the degree of redeployment for each of the five redeployment variables. We took the mean value of resource redeployment that the respondents reported for any item within each of the five similar-resource redeployment variables. We then used the values to create measures that denoted high bilateral, moderate bilateral, unilateral to targets, unilateral to acquirers and low redeployment, similar to the measures that we reported in Table 2 (a). The high bilateral category contains cases in which resource redeployment to targets and acquirers both equal at least 4. The moderate bilateral category includes cases for which resource redeployment (i) to targets is 3 and to acquirers is at least 3, or (ii) to acquirers is 3 and to targets is at least 3. The unilateral to targets category includes cases for which resource redeployment to targets is at least 3 and to acquirers is <3-The unilateral to acquirers category includes cases for which resource redeployment to acquirers is at least 3 and to targets is <3-The baseline category of low redeployment includes cases for which resource redeployment to both acquirers and targets is <3. 4 78 Table 3 reports the impact on the five capabilities of redeploying each of the five resource constructs. The table provides the results of five MANOVA analyses of the association between resource redeployment type and reported post-acquisition improvement in the capabilities of the target and acquiring businesses. A larger F-statistic indicates a greater relationship between resource redeployment and improved capabilities.
The analysis in Table 3 shows that bilateral resource redeployment often leads to improved capabilities. High bilateral redeployment has the most consistent effect, while moderate bilateral redeployment is significant in several cases. Unilateral redeployment is rarely significant.
High bilateral resource redeployment has statistically significant association in 96% (24/25) of the cases. For all five types of resources, a high degree of bilateral redeployment associates with improved R&D skills (column 1) and product quality (column 3). High bilateral redeployment associates with faster time to market for all but commercial resources (panel B, column 2) and to lower product cost. In addition, output flexibility increases with high bilateral redeployment.
A moderate degree of bilateral redeployment affects capabilities in 20% of the cases. Moderate bilateral redeployment of technical resources affects almost all capabilities (panel A).
Unilateral redeployment is significant in only 22% (11/50) of the cases. The primary cases involve redeployment of commercial and administrative resources to targets. Redeployment of commercal resources (panel B) and general administrative resources (panel D) to targets affects R&D skills, time to market and product quality (columns 1, 2 and 3). Unilateral redeployment of operational and general administrative resources to acquirers also has a significant association with improved product cost and time to market.
The implication of the capabilities analysis is that bilateral redeployment, especially a high degree of redeployment, often leads to improved business capabilities within the single corporation that results from an acquisition. In addition, unilateral redeployment of commercial, operational or administrative resources from or to targets sometimes affects the aggregate capabilities of the combined businesses. Again, we stress that the strongest impact on the combined capabilities of the acquiring and target businesses comes from bilateral resource redeployment. Thus, in addition to showing that post-acquisition bilateral redeployment is common, the results of this study highlight the important role of bilateral redeployment in improving business capabilities.
Conclusion
This study highlights the importance of post-acquisition bilateral resource redeployment in reshaping business capabilities. The analysis shows that firms frequently undertake substantial bilateral resource redeployment following horizontal acquisitions. On some resource dimensions, at least a moderate degree of bilateral resource redeployment occurs in more than half of the cases studied. Even with the more stringent criterion of high bilateral redeployment, bilateral redeployment of some resources occurs in as much as a quarter of the cases. The focal empirical conclusion is that firms commonly reconfigure both target and acquiring businesses following acquisitions.
Our exploratory study of post-acquisition capabilities improvements shows striking relationships with resource redeployment. In particular, a high degree of bilateral redeployment affects R&D skills, time to market, product quality, product cost and output flexibility. Thus, bilateral resource redeployment has a multi-dimensional impact on business capabilities.
At least four distinct patterns concerning the incidence of bilateral redeployment stand out. First, firms commonly undertake bilateral sameresource redeployment, especially of technical and commercial resources. Second, firms commonly undertake bilateral similar-resource and vertically related resource redeployment of technical and commercial resources. Third, acquirers also frequently undertake bilateral redeployment of financial and administrative resources to targets, in combination with obtaining technical and commercial resources from the targets. Fourth, by contrast, firms rarely redeploy financial and administrative resources from targets to acquirers. Instead, targets are most often the unilateral recipients of administrative and financial resources.
The comparative set of redeployment patterns has three implications. First, firms often expect to be able to redeploy technical and commercial resources across the target and acquiring businesses to the benefit of both businesses. Second, acquirers often provide administrative and financial support to targets, whether or not they obtain technical and commercial resources from the targets, probably because the acquirers hope to support the development of new resources at the target business. Third, acquirers prefer to rely on their existing administrative skills rather than create new combinations of administrative systems. Thus, acquisitions tend to represent administrative expansion of the acquirer, even if the firms undertake substantial technicalcommercial integration of the resources of the acquirer and target.
We believe that these empirical patterns support an important conceptual argument, namely that business acquisitions play a key role in a business's ability to adapt in competitive environments. Acquisitions often allow both acquiring and target businesses to obtain resoutces that they could not purchase in arm's length market exchanges, owing to market failures stemming from information limits and fears of opportunistic behavior. In turn, the new resources often help the combined business improve its capabilities. In this view, many acquisitions are a positive element of corporate growth, contributing to both firm performance and social welfare.
